The Intersection of Citizenship and Gender in Singapore's Civil Society Lenore LYONS In November 2002, a group of Singaporean activists established a group called The Working Committee 2 (TWC2) to advocate for the rights of foreign domestic workers In Singapore. By limiting both Its lifespan and the scope of its activities, the TWC2 avoided the requirement that all NGOs formally register under the Singapore Registrar of Societies. At the end of its year-long campaign, however, the group signalled its intention to continue with its advocacy work. The new TWC2 (row called Transient Workers Count Too) was registered in August 20C4. For some commentators, the TWC2 represents a new phase In the People's Action Party's (PAP) engagement with Singapore's "civil society experiment" and a loosening up of the "OE markers" (boundaries marking politically acceptable activism). An examination of the TWC2's experience, however, shows that the opportunities for S ngaporean activists to address the politically fraught Issues of citizenship and gender remain little changed, Nonetheless, the TWC2's success in raising the profile of foreign domestic workers has brought about some significant improvements in the regulatory regime governing the conditions of maid employment, I look forward to working together with all Singaporeans and with a broad spectrum of civic groups to grow our civic society, strengthen our sense of pride and ownership, and draw us closer together as one people. But remember that unity, pride and ownership depends also on a sense of common goals and shared visions. (Lee 2004a) In January 2004, in a landmark speech outlining his political platform as Singapore's Prime Minister Designate, Lee Hsien Loong spoke at length about "civic society" and "active citizenry". He argued that it is the responsibility of all Singaporeans to promote active participation in Singapore's social and cultural life. Such involvement requires continued commitment to a set of national values and a sense of "common goals and shared visions". Lee's comments are consistent with statements made by previous leaders about the creation of a sphere of civil society that reflects "Asian values" such as consensus ahead of confrontation.
According to Lee, Singapore's civic society will be made up of active citizens who contribute to the state's nation-building project by providing thoughtful feedback and participating in state-sanctioned grassroots activities. This vision remains bounded, however, by the parameters of the nation-state; civic society is a space occupied by citizens engaged in the national project.
And yet, the Singaporean nation is intrinsically linked to the global political economy and subject to transnational flows of capital, people, ideas, and disease. Although Singapore recovered relatively quickly from the Asian financial crises of the late 1990s, in recent years economic growth has been impacted by global terrorism and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). As unemployment rates rise and wages are cut, Singaporean workers are increasingly concerned about the presence of large numbers of migrant workers, "foreign talent",1 and permanent residents, whose commitment to the nation is questioned. It is against this backdrop that in August 2004 a group calling itself "Transient Workers Count Too" (TWC2) was formed to advocate on behalfofmigrant workers in Singapore. Using the TWC2 as a case study, dais paper examines the efforts of Singapore's "active citizens" to address the forces of transnational labour migration. By juxtaposing Lee Hsien Loong's statements about civic society against the work of the TWC2, this study brings into relief the underlying tensions between the ruling party's vision of an active citizenry and attempts by local activists to advocate on behalfofnon-citizens. In doing so, I highlight the ways that citizenship and gender intersect in shaping the work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Singapore.
The first part of this paper provides an overview of the issues facing NGOs in Singapore as they attempt to forge a politically acceptable space for themselves within the parameters of the ruling party's civic society. This section provides the context for understanding civil society 210Lenore LYONS activism in Singapore. I argue that the constraints on activist engagement that are faced by Singaporean NGOs are compounded when issues ofcit zenship are central to activist concerns. Most accounts of NGOs and civil society actors in Singapore use the "local" as their site of analysis.2 Even those studies which take as the focus of their analysis the potentially globalized phenomenon of Internet politics retain the Singapore state and the bounded territory of the nation as their object of attention (see, for example, Ho, Baber, and Khondker 2002; George 2003) . This analysis moves away from the ,study of "local activism" to focus instead on "ethnoscapes of activism", a term used by Law (2003, p. 206) to contextualize NGO activism "within a broader frame of diasporic politics that account for the flow of ideas as well as people". Such an approach works to avoid the tendency to celebrate the emancipatory potential of transnational or global civil society by focusing on multiple and shifting scales of politics. (The multiple and shifting scales of politics are also explored in different contexts within this volume by Kersty Hobson ["Considering 'Green' Practices"] and Ooi Can Seng ["State-Civil Society Relations and Tourism"]).
In the second part of the paper I give a detailed account of the TWC2's activities, paying particular attention to issues of citizenship and gender relations. Throughout this paper, the concept of "citizenship" is used to refer to two interconnected issues -the making of citizens/ non-citizens (particularly the ways in which state and non-state actors participate in the discursive construction of citizenship categories), and citizenship rights (used in its broadest sense to refer to social, political, and cultural rights). My interest is in whether the TWC2 is able to challenge the rhetoric of active citizenry by including in its platform a space for non-citzens to play a role in Singapore's civic society. In other words, is the TWC2 able to problematize the PAP's definition of an "active citizenry" and by association the meanings of citizenship for the Singaporean nation-state? To address this issue, I examine the extent to which migrant workers are included the TWC2's work and how their needs and interests are represented by Singaporean activists. I also explore the degree to which the TWC2 is able to focus its attention on issues beyond the nation-state by engaging with groups beyond Singapore's borders and by incorporating an analysis of globalization into its work. This latter issue goes to the heart of international debates about the impact of globalization on the citizenship rights of transnational workers both at home and abroad. This analysis will show that while the TWC2 has been critical ofthe state's treatment ofmigrant workers, it has had limited success in fundamentally challenging the entrenched rules that constrain NGO activism in Singapore. (The   reason for Haas (1989) argued that despite a parliament modelled on Westminster-style democracy, the PAP has effectively restricted the growth of a partici212Lenore LYONS patory parliamentary system, and instead fostered a "mass society" characterized by a lack ofpolitical institutions between the state and the people; Singapore lacks an effective civil society. Since the mid-1990s, however, the PAP has sought to encourage the growth of a more active citizenry through the promotion ofcivic society. The term "civic society" is favoured because it emphasizes civic responsibility as opposed to the rights ofcitizenship implied by the concept ofcivil society (Chua 2000, p. 5).3 Civic society is not a space in which individual rights are protected, but a »pace in which the state's vision of national values of "nation, family, community, consensus, and harmony" is expressed. The discourse of civic society also stresses the positive attributes of "civility, kindness, and public orderliness" exemplified in state-sponsored courtesy and graciousness campaigns (Lee 2002) . In this way it is supportive of the state's encouragement of volunteering and chart :able work as evidenced in its promotion ofVolunteer Welfare Organizations (VWOs) in contrast to NGOs.
The PAP describes its support for the growth of civic society as an attempt to encourage Singaporean citizens to taite on greater responsibility for shaping the character of the country's future, albeit within tightly controlled limits. Speaking in 1991, Singapore's then Minister for Information and the Arts, Brigadier General (BG) George Yeo, likened the all-pervasive power of the PAP to the banyan tree:
The problem now is that under the banyan tree, very little else can grow. When state institutions are too pervasive, civic institutions cannot thrive . Therefore, it is necessary to prune the banyan tree so that other plants can grow. (Cited in Worthington 2003, p. 7) BG Yeo's statement apparently signalled a change in the way that the PAP would rule; the heavy-handed approach ofthe ruling; party towards NGOs and civil society actors would be replaced with a more "handsoff" style in which Singaporeans would be encouraged to take a more active role in civ: c society.
More recently, the concept of an "active citizenry" has become part of this broader discourse of civic responsibility:
The hallmark of Singaporeans in the 21st century will be active participation in civic life. This will be built upon a foundation of mutual respect and trust between the public and people sectors, and enlightened by commitment to the values and principles that underpin Singapore. (S21 Facilitation Committee 2003) This vision requires Singapore's "active citizens" to inform themselves of issues and challenges facing the country; offer feedback and suggestions in a thoughtful manner with the aim of making things better; and help to implement what they suggest (S21 Facilitation Committee 2003). Lee Hsien Loong spelt these attributes out more clearly in January 2004 when he signalled that under his leadership new guidelines for public consultations on new policies or regulations would be developed. These guidelines will be employed by the civil service to ensure that there is adequate "public consultation" on government policy. Singaporeans will be encouraged to debate policies "rigorously and robustly" through these public consultation exercises.
Lee cautioned, however, that such debate "has to be issue-focused, based on facts and logic, and not just on assertions and emotions. The overriding objective is to reach correct conclusions on the best way forward for the country" (Lee 2004a ). The media would play an important role in achieving this vision of civic engagement. Its role is to ensure that the news is reported "accurately and fairly" so as to educate the public on a national perspective on issues. Attention to these "guidelines" for civic engagement would produce an "open and inclusive Singapore" in which:
Our people should feel free to express diverse views, pursue unconventional ideas, or simply be different. We should have the confidence to engage in robust debate, so as to understand our problems, conceive fresh solutions, and open up new spaces. (Lee 2004b, p. 6) In putting forward guidelines for public consultation, Lee was at pains to point out that this was not an articulation of the "out-of-bounds markers" (OB markers) that identify subjects that are "off-limits". These have been described as "issues that are too sensitive to be discussed in public for fear of destabilizing or jeopardizing public peace and order" 214Lenore LYONS (Ho 2000, p. 186) . The ruling party is responsible for determining the limits of the OB markers, a task that it largely performs retrospectively with the result that what actually constitutes "unacceptable political engagement" is unclear. Rejecting claims that die growth ofcivil society has been impeded by the government's refusal to clearly spell out these boundaries, Lee Hsien Loong asserts:
Had we pre-defined all the parameters for discussion, civil society would have lost the spark and autonomy that allows fresh areas to be explored, limits to be redefined, and both Government and civic groups to develop a certain responsiveness to each other and move society forward by engaging each other. (Lee 2004a) In a characteristic act of double-speak, the PAP claims that its failure to clearly spell out the OB markers in fact encourages the growth of civic society by improving the relationship between the government and NGOs.
Lee's statement points to the difference between civil activism and civic responsibility By putting the onus on NGOs to regulate their own behaviour by second-guessing die state's responses, the PAP has not only forced civil society actors to model their actions on the government's cues but also to see themselves as partners rather than combatants. NGOs internalize and adopt die ruling party's ideology and are rewarded for their "consultative" approach. They engage in a process of selfregulation based on inherent conservatism shaped by a fear of being closed down (Lyons 2000a) . This is the point that Garry Rodan (2003, p. 506 ) makes when he argues that repressive laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA)4 are of diminishing importance. In their place, administrative law (such as the Societies Act, see below) and extensive mechanisms of political co-option are more effective. Where this is combined with an inherent conservativism that reflects the middle-class values promoted by the ruling elite, the opportunities for civil society actors to question the PAP's "rules of engagement" are further undermined (PuruShotam 1998) . This has led Rodan to claim that Singapore is characterized by the presence of "civil society forces" rather than genuine civil society.
Advocating for Domestic Worker Rights
Numerous studies have documented the tenuous position of female migrant workers in relation to labour laws and citizenship rights in the Asia-Pacific (Huang and Yeoh 1996; Lim and Oishi 1996; Yeoh and Huang 1997; Lindio-McGovern 2001) . Sending and receiving states have been slow to address these workers' welfare despite their dependency on the labour and remittances of migrant workers. NGOs have stepped into this breach, providing both information and assistance to migrant workers. The most visible of these are Filipino migrant worker groups based in Hong Kong, Japan, and the Philippines (Ball and Piper 2002; Law and Nadeu 1999; Law 2003) .
Nicola Piper (2003) argues that Filipino migrant worker groups have received the most scholarly attention not only because of the significant proportion of female domestic workers from the Philippines who work in the region, but also because they have the strongest transnational advocacy networks. Although Singapore is a major receiving country for female migrant labour in the region, groups such as these are noticeably absent. In part, their absence can be explained by the presence of a strong, authoritarian state and a relatively weak NGO sector.
Foreign-based NGOs have always found it difficult to operate on the ground in Singapore. While the Singapore Constitution guarantees freedom of association (Article 14) in principle, organizations with more than ten members or committees with more than five members are required to register under the Societies Act or the Companies Act. Individuals who participate in groups that are not officially registered face the threat of arrest and imprisonment for participating in "illegal assemblies". All registered organizations are expressly prohibited from engaging in "political activity" and must restrict their activities to issues outlined in their constitutions. The government has effectively used the Societies Act to suppress the activities of a number of local groups5 as well as foreign-based NGOs. Without registration and accreditation these groups cannot operate on the ground. This has resulted in a very small international NGO presence in Singapore, and very few 216Lenore LYONS formalized transnational linkages between local, regional, and global groups. Where transnational links do occur, they are mostly at the level of informal networks and participation in regional or international conferences or workshops (Lyons 2004; Tanaka 2002) .
In addition, for many years the plight of migrant workers in Singapore has remained "out of bounds". Like many taboo topics, the issue of migrant labour has not been publicly identified by the state in its official statements as a topic that is off-limits, but :ts association with the "Marxist conspiracy" has meant that few NGOs have been willing to address it. The Marxist conspiracy is a term used to describe the arrest and detention under the ISA of 22 people in May 1987 for threatening the state and national interests (Rodan 1993, p. 92) . Among those arrested included were Catholic social workers and lay workers from the Geylang Catholic Centre for Foreign Workers. This group advocated for higher wages, social security benefits, job security, and employment conditions for all foreign workers (Mauzy and Mi.ne 2002, p. 130) . At the time of their arrest, the government claimed that Catholic organizations were "a cover for political agitation" to "radicalise student and Christian activists" (cited in Haas 1989, p. 59 (Lyons 2004 ). The inherent conservatism of both organizations partly explains the reluctance of the local women's movement to address the needs of migrant workers since the mid-1980s. Working within the framework provided by the OB markers, local women's groups temper their public statements or limit their activities to avoid criticism (Lyons 2000b ).
The labour movement has also been silent on issues surrounding migrant labour in Singapore. Most independent unions were closed down or weakened in the 1 960s, and replaced by a state-sponsored National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) that acts as an umbrella group for affiliated organizations that are largely supportive of the government's economic and labour policies (Rodan 1996, p. 100) . The labour movement has emerged as a co-partner with both the government and employer groups to ensure Singapore's continued economic growth and sustainability. As the numbers of migrant workers in Singapore rose during the 1990s, there were increasing concerns that such workers were linked to higher crime rates, drug offences, and the spread of contagious diseases. Trade unions were called upon to assist in helping such workers to adjust to the local environment through social outings and other organized events (Low 2001; Channel NewsAsia 9 May 2004) . Foreign workers may join local trade unions, although there are caps on their representation at the executive level.7 Unions have played little role, however, in advocating for better working conditions for such workers. More recently, as levels of retrenchment and unemployment rise the NTUC has sided with the concerns of local workers and expressed its concern that the migrant workers are taking "Singaporean jobs" (Channel Singapore to deal with the rights of migrant workers. Their actions, however, were largely ad hoc and mostly related to female domestic workers. Throughout the 1990s, as a result of high publicity cases of maid abuse or death, migrant worker welfare became a significant issue for bilateral relations between receiving and sending countries throughout Southeast Asia.8 For example, increasing pressure was placed on the Philippine government to utilize the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) to protect the rights of overseas workers. The OWWA runs a range of services for overseas Filipino workers, including providing refuge for maids in a number of countries. In Singapore, the OWWA operate? a half-way house for runaway maids; through the Philippine Embassy.
Although Christian churches were initially extremely careful in their public dealings with migrant workers because ofongoing concerns about the association between Catholicism and the Marxist conspiracy, they gradually came to play a renewed role. Muslim groups too began providing support and training services to Muslim workers (predominantly from Indonesia) through their mosque-based outreach programmes. Both groups act informally to assist "runaway" maids to contact embassy officials when they needed assistance. In 1998, the Catholic Archdiocese of Singapore established the Commission for Migrants and Itinerant People (CMI). One of its goals is to reach out to "strangers" (including migrant workers, foreign students, travellers, and refugees) "who have experienced injustice, oppression and alienation" (CMI 2001) . For example, in relation to domestic workers, the CMI works with the Singapore Ministry of Manpower to run workshops for employers on "How to Establish a Harmonious Working Relationship with Your Foreign Domestic Helper". Catholic Welfare Services also runs half-way houses, such as the Good Shepherd Centre. Both groups operate in partnership with the Singaporeaa government to address the question of individual treatment of domestic workers by employers, rathe:: than dealing with broader questions of labour law, immigration law, or citizenship rights.
Transient Workers Count Too?219
The Working Committee 2 (TWC2) Migrant workers are part of a global phenomenon of transnational labour movements from which Singapore is not immune. One-quarter of Singapore's workforce is made up of foreign workers (Channel NewsAsia 18 July 2004). The Singapore government does not release precise data on the numbers of migrant workers in Singapore because ofpublic sensitivity about their presence. Available data shows that out of a total resident population of 4 million, 3 million are Singaporean citizens, 350,000 are permanent residents, and 800,000 are foreign residents on long-term employment or spouse passes (Lian 2004 ). The majority of migrant workers in low-skilled areas are Work Permit holders. Migrant workers in white-collar professions (referred to as "foreign talent") are issued with a separate category of visa (called "employment passes"). In comparison with other countries in Southeast Asia, Singapore has a relatively small number of undocumented migrant workers due to its tough immigration controls, tight regulation of the labour market, and active policing of work sites. While some undocumented workers enter Singapore illegally, the majority enter on tourist passes and work until their passes expire or they remain and become over-stayers.
It is estimated that there are currently over 150,000 foreign domestic workers (FDWs) in Singapore, made up of a third each from the Philippines and Indonesia, and a significant minority from Sri Lanka (Tan and Almenoar 2004; "New Maids to Take Test in Batam", 16 February 2004). This equates to approximately one foreign domestic worker to every seven households (Yeoh, Huang, and Devasahayam 2004) . The feminization oftransnational labour migration and the role ofthe "maid economy" in Singapore has attracted considerable scholarly attention Yeoh 1996, 1998; Huang 1998, 1999; Yeoh, Huang, and Devasahayam 2004) . Much of this work focuses on the tenuous position of female domestic workers in relation to labour laws and citizenship rights. Female migrant workers face difficult working conditions, poor remuneration, and constant surveillance by both the state and their employers. the rights of FDWs in Singapore. The group modelled itself on the short-lived "The Working Committee" or TWC, which was formed in late 1998 and disbanded a year later.9 The TWC2's activities were organized under the banner "Dignity Overdue: Respecting the Rights of Maids", and included research on the conditions or FDWs; meetings (called "dialogue sessions") with a range of key stakeholders; a public education campaign; and community-based activities (TWC2 2003e). The TWC2's aim was to "promote respect for domestic workers through education, and secure better treatment of domestic workers through legislation and other means" (TWC2 2003c). Like its predecessor, theTWC2 deliberately chose not to seek accreditation from the Registrar of Societies. Drawing on the state's apparent support for the TWC as an alternative model of civic society activism, the TWC2 also limited its lifespan to one year and restricted the scope of its activities. International Day to Eliminate Violence against Women on 25 November 2003 marked the culmination of its year-long efforts. Braema Mathi, a Nominated
Member of Parliament10 and member of AWARE , chaired the committee. Both AWARE and the SCWO were listed as "partner" organizations, and the TWC2 website and bulletin board were hosted on the AWARE website.
Consistent with other NGOs in Singapore, rather than adopting a direct lobbying role in relation to legislative change, theTWC2 focused its activities on public education and indirect (often private) meetings with stakeholders. The TWC2's research programme documented the experiences of foreign domestic workers and examined existing legislation regulating their employment. The research findings have not been formally published but were presented as public and closed-door forums as a means of stimulating feedback and discussion. These and other events provided an opportunity for TWC2 to meet with a range ofstakeholders, including FDWs, employers, agencies, embassies, trade unions, government bodies, and NGOs.
Part of the group's activities directed attention to the gendered division of labour within the home, and finding alternatives to Singapore's reliance on the labour of domestic workers. For example, the art-installation "houseWORK project" brought together artists who asked members of the audience to bring along their clothes to be ironed on stage as a means of highlighting the "work" involved in the home (Teng 2003) . The TWC2 also drew attention to problems such as the lack of childcare or after-school care, the lack of nursing homes or alternative facilities for the care of the elderly or disabled, and the lack offamily-friendly workplace policies within both the public and private sectors. By educating Singaporeans about the need for gender equality within the home, the TWC2's activities were also linked to a programme of social change that would create a "future free from sexism" (Price and Lim 2003) .
Recognizing, however, that finding alternatives for domestic workers would take some time, the TWC2's other interest was in engaging the public through television, radio, and print media about the "rights" of domestic workers. Here "rights" referred to two interrelated issues: improving treatment of maids by their by employers, and standardizing employment contracts. These issues were addressed in the context of "professionalizing" the FDW industry. In particular, members were 222Lenore LYONS concerned with eliminating violence against female domestic workers by their employer;:. For this reason, the group's activities culminated with a series ofevents focused on Singapore's first "White Ribbon Campaign".11
In relation to employment contracts, the TWC2 focused on issues to do with working hours, off days, and wages. It encouraged employers to provide a day off per week to their employees. Members organized a "Sunday-Off Campaign" that included a Block Party12 for workers and their employers, and a photography exhibition of maids on their days off (Tee 2003) . Members also used the Forum pages in the local media to raise the issue of standardized contracts for foreign domestic workers (Price and Lim 2003) .
These and othsr initiatives were successful in raising public awareness of the issues surrounding conditions of work. The PAP government, however, continuss to argue that the matter ofworking conditions is an issue to be negotiated between individual employers (or agents) and employees becauss ofthe individual nature of the duties required in each household (J. Tan The original TWC2's activities were consistent with the model of active citizenry promoted by the PAP government. Its members adopted a conservative approach in their dealings with the state, preferring to engage with policy-makers via "closed-door" forums or "dialogue sessions". Most of its activities focused on public education campaigns that centred on the gendered division oflabour within the home, and instances of abuse against maids. My interest is in the extent to which the TWC2 was able to challenge the rhetoric of active citizenry by including in its platform a space for non-citizens to play an active role in Singapore's civil society, either by involving them in the TWC2's work or by highlighting their contribution to Singapore's national develop ment. Both issues relate to the politics of representation. The first is a measure ofthe extent to which FDWs are represented as equal partners in the TWC2's activities, while the second relates to the ways in which FDWs are constructed as subjects of activist intervention.
The TWC2 adopted a conscious decision to include the voices of FDWs in its campaign work. Domestic workers were welcomed as members of the network and events were organized that specifically targeted their involvement.16 One of these was the 'Sundays-Off Campaign", which centred on a Block Party for domestic workers and their employers. The party was held on the void deck ofa local housing block and employers and their maids from the local area were encouraged to attend. Although the event received a great deal of publicity, members were disappointed by the poor turnout from domestic worker,·;. 17 Another event in which employers and their maids Apart from these events, and a public forum in which three domestic workers were asked to speak about their experiences, there were few other opportunities for members of the TWC2 to interact with FDWs or to hear their stories. This is not surprising given the problems faced by FDWs as a class ofworkers -isolation, poor English language skills, lack of"free time", and frequently a tenuous immigration status.18 When this is combined with cultural and gender scripts that discourage participation in public life as well as distrust of government agencies (including the police), participation in NGO activities and other forms ofcivil society engagement may be viewed with considerable distrust by such workers.19
The problems faced by the TWC2 in getting employers and maids to attend these functions together points to the inherent power differentials between the two groups. It is also linked to the associated problem of reaching out to women who are often isolated within the homes of their employers with limited access to information about groups that seek to advocate on their behalf. Where maids were part of the TWC2's activities, they were often invited to come along by Singaporeans who knew them because of their work as maids (either because they were the woman's employer or a member ofher employer's extended family). Their relationships with members of theTWC2 were thus embedded within complex relations of class, nationality, and employment. One of the striking issues that the TWC2 had to confront in its work was the fact that a significant number of its own members are employers of domestic workers. While their actions can be explained as instances of "good" employer-employee relations (for example, regular off days, good wages, lack ofabuse), nonetheless their ability to advocate on behalf of domestic workers is a product of the labour of those very same women. 226Lenore LYONS Foreign domestic workers were clearly not equal partners in the TWC2's activities. This lack ofparticipation is not necessarily problematic where it is combined with careful attention to issues of representation. One of the enduring debates within international feminism centres on the ability of feminists to represent the interests of women unlike themselves. Feminist scholars have long been interested in the politics ofspeech acts. This interest is based on an acknowledgment that women are "not politically equal, and, given that politics is connected to truth, all are not episteniically equal" (Alcoff 1991, pp. 14-15) . Acts ofspeech are problematic because we are all located within structures of oppression. For this reason there has been a concern to distinguish between two interrelated practices -speaking for others and speaking about others. Speaking about others is an act of representation ("participating in the construction of their subject-positions") and thus a process of interpretation (Alcoff 1991, p. 9) . In contrast, speaking for or on behalf of others is a process of appropriation (taking on aspects of the Other's identity/experience) and thus deception (Gunew 1993) . Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) describes the difference between these two forms of representation as that between a portrait and a proxy, and calls on feminists to disavow the latter. While many women may accept the moral and ethical imperative to relinquish claims to "speak for" other women while continuing to "speak about" therr , others claim that they have a political responsibility as feminists to speak when other women cannot. However, the question is not, as Spivak points out, whether the subaltern can speak, but who can speak, who will listen, and how?
In the case of the TWC2, the representation of foreign domestic workers was overwhelmingly informed by a discourse ofvictimhood that stemmed from the initial instance ofabuse that acted as a catalyst to the group's formation. The quotation "It is not my business. He can do what he wants, that's his problem" was displayed prominently in the top banner of the TWC2 website, along with images of domestic workers engaged in housework. This view is further reflected in the group's statement about why the "White Ribbon Campaign" was focused on foreign domestic workers:
. . . because she is the most vulnerable woman in our homes. She is a guest worker, here at our invitation, to support our families and earn an honest living for their own families. Help agencies get one new case of abuse every week. Every act of violence against her is a shame on us. (TWC2 2003d) Violence was a central trope in the TWC2's media campaign such that journalists felt the need to find alternative voices that would counter the stories of abuse (see, for example, Arshad 2003a). The TWC2's strategy not only had the effect of defining FDWs as primarily "victims" in need of saving by benevolent Singaporeans, but also meant that the circumstances of the vast majority ofworkers who do not face violence in the workplace were obfuscated.
In the absence of FDWs own voices, the TWC2 commissioned two other groups to tell their stories about "maids". The first of these were children who took part in an essay writing competition via their schools.
More than 2000 children from 40 primary schools took part in the competition (TWC2 2003b). Fourteen of the prize winning stories were published on theTWC2 website. In these stories a number of recurring themes emerge. Even at a young age the children demonstrated a clear awareness of the problems surrounding maid abuse and negative attitudes towards domestic workers in Singapore. Li Yi Hong, who won first prize in the Primary 4 category, wrote: I feel very sad for those maids who get bullied by employers. They get tortured so badly and seeing all their scars and cuts makes me want to cry. We are always commanding them around, treating them like servants. I find it very important to treat them as friends. (Li Yi Hong, cited in TWC2 2003b) The theme of friendship re-emerges in many of the stories -the women are described as "good friends", "best friends", and "elder sisters": "Cora is the greatest friend. She has great talents. I think Cora is not like other maids -she is unbelievable!" (Sacha Armstrong, cited in TWC2 2003b).
The children also reflected on their own affluence compared with the hardship faced by domestic workers in their home countries. Recounting stories of poverty told to them by their domestic workers, the children The exhibition was motivated by a desire to show domestic workers as human subjects rather than always defined as workers. The human face of domestic labour would portray FDWs as mothers, sisters, wives, and friends; and as women in a strange country confronted by a range of emotions from fear and trepidation on arrival, to love and fondness for their employers. In a newspaper article titled "They're Maid Like You and I", Braema Mathi was quoted as saying "We wanted co strip her of this invisibility and show her as a human being, within our homes, who has her own interests and friends outside ofher workplace" (Tee 2003).
In both cases. Singaporeans drew on their own common-sense assumptions about "the life of a maid', to represent "the other" in their midst. These included images of women attending medical check-ups, agent briefings, training sessions or self-help workshops, as well as women acting as care-givers to members of their employers' households.
In taking images of the emotional parting of an Indonesian maid from her three young charges at the airport, photographer Wang Hui Fen commented: "I went to places like Mustafa and Lucky Plaza [shopping centres] at first as I wanted to portray a maid shopping for goods before she went home. But I realised that some kids do become very attached to their maids, so I decided to stake out the airport instead" (Tee 2003).
In the case of the photographs, such acts of representation required intrusion into the "personal" life of the women being photographed, thus reinforcing the continual blurring ofthe boundaries between public and private space that characterizes the life of domestic workers. Not only is the "public" nature of their work ignored by a state that treats "women's work" as a private affair, but domestic workers also find themselves the constant object of employer surveillance within the "private" space of the home (Lyons 2005) . Many women have very little private space in the workplace, and paradoxically may live out their "private lives" in the anonymity afforded by public places such as parks and shopping malls. By "staking out" maids in such places for a glimpse of their "human face", the photographers contributed to the construction of the domestic workers as "public property".
Perhaps the most significant act of representation, however, was linked to the TWC2's use of the term "foreign domestic worker" and the associated acronym "FDW. Although it also used the term "maid" as part of its activities, members preferred to use FDW This was part of a decision to link the work of FDWs to debates about work and the unrecognized nature ofwomen's household responsibilities. In doing so, they succeeded in constructing FDWs as "workers" rather than just women involved in traditional caring activities. This was the central focus of the "houseWORK" campaign. It was also implicit in the TWC2's claims about employment contracts and the need to include this group ofworkers in the Employment Act. One of the consequences of constructing the women in this way, was that the public association ofworkers as national subjects (Filipinas, Indonesians, and so forth) was 230Lenore LYONS weakened. The women that the TWC2 advocated on behalf of were "women workers", and as such shared common experiences of oppression. Breaking down ethnic and nationality barriers between women in this way can be an important means of coalition building amongst diverse groups. In Hong Kong, the work of the .Asian Migrant Coordinating E>ody (AMCB), which brings together different nationality-basec migrant organizations that had previously worked independently, functions in a similar way. Law (2003, p. 216) argues that the emergence of this coalition "reflects the important perspective in Hong Kong of domestic workers as "workers", and attempts to build solidarity on this basis. It also reflects the financial imperatives of domestic workers themselves, who migrate to Hong Kong primarily for economic reasons".
In the context ofSingapore, where nationality-based migrant worker NGOs only operate around official government outposts such as embassies, and wiere the isolated nature of domestic work means that there are few opportunities for women to meet each other, the TWC2 provided a context in which domestic workers could see themselves as a group ofworkers who shared common experiences of exploitation and oppression. The limited presence of FDWs in the group's events, however, meant :hat the potential for forming strong cross-national alliances was slim . Similarly, the potential to build alliances with local domestic workers remained unaddressed; as the acronym "FDW" suggests, the women were first and foremost "foreign" workers.
This strategy of constructing FDWs as a common "class" ofworkers is more successful, however, in challenging common stereotypes about the qualities ofmaids. These stereotypes are a central component of the marketing and recruitment process used by agencies in placing domestic workers with employers (Lyons 2005) . The key marker of product differentiation is nationality, which in turn draws on common-sense assumptions about gender, ethnicity, religion, language ability, class, and educational qualifications (Huang and Yeoh 1998) . These characteristics shape employment conditions, with Filipinas receiving higher wages than Indonesians , who in turn receive higher wages than Sri Lankans.
Filipinas are also :nore likely to receive one day off per week compared with odier national groups. The women themselves are quite familiar with these stereotypes. Filipinas are "outspoken" and more "hardworking" than Indonesians who are "quiet and stupid". Employers are told that despite their expense and demanding nature, Filipinas are "good with children", whereas Indonesians are better at mundane household chores (Lyons 2005) . By arguing for standardized contracts for all workers, the TWC2 deliberately broke the nexus between nationality and conditions of employment, particularly as it relates to wages and hours ofwork.
It is clear, however, that there were few opportunities for non-citizens to be active TWC2 partners. Rather than active subjects in Singapore's civil society, maids were the objects ofthe TWC2's activities. They were represented as victims and as workers, but also implicitly as aliens. The division between Singapore's active citizens and their passive client group -victimized, foreign workers -remained entrenched. In this sense the TWC2's work was consistent with the PAP's vision of civil society as a space occupied by Singaporean citizens. The problems associated with attempts by Singaporean activists to include FDWs as equal partners in their work further reveals the contradictions surrounding attempts to forge transnational alliances. Not only does it point to the need to interrogate the desire of those with socio-economic power to develop rapport and intimacy with "the other" (Sampaio 2004, p. 199) , but it also highlights how attempts to work across differences of ethnicity, class, and culture, requires attention to the structural factors that shape globalization. It is this second issue that I turn to next.
Active Citizens as Transnational Actors
As I argued above, the PAP's vision of civic society is primarily oriented towards national development and the construction ofshared values. In contrast, by orienting its work around issues of migrant labour, the TWC2 provided an opportunity for Singaporean activists to challenge this vision ofcivic society and focus their attention on issues beyond the nation-state. Advocating on behalf of migrant workers could provide Singaporeans with the opportunity to engage with groups beyond Singapore's borders and thus to see themselves as part ofa global migrant 232Lenore LYONS rights movement. By drawing attention to the processes ofglobalization such work also his the potential to encourage Singaporean activists to focus their attention beyond national borders.
The TWC2 had limited contact with migrant worker NGOs based overseas, and it remains largely isolated from the many transnational activist networks advocating for migrant worker rights. Instead, it focused its activities on building alliances with Singaporean-based groups, such as A$ARE, SCWO, and CMI, and engaging in "dialogue" with non-Singaporean stakeholders such as diplomats in the embassies of sending countries. In this regard, theTWC2's actions are consistent with other Singap orean NGOs. For example, AWARE very rarely makes public statements about the status or rights ofwomen in other countries, preferring instead to focus its attention on local issues. Ironically, on one of the few occasions in which AWARE broke its self-imposed silence on women overseas, it found itself the target of a backlash against its own failure to take a stand on the issue of foreign domestic workers in Singapore.20 The SCWO, as a government-sponsored umbrella group has very strong ties with regional and international women's networks. Both AWARE and the SCWO participate in these networks as Singaporean NGO representatives. However, these are neirworking roles aimed at building contacts with women internationally, sharing information and reporting on events in Singapore. As such, they do not constitute examples of collaborative action around specific events or issues (that is, transnational activism).
This failure or" local NGOs to engage transnational!) as part of an international campaign reflects fears about government attitudes towards international agencies and foreign-based NGOs. In a recent statement explaining changes to the registration process for NGOs, Senior Minister of State (Law and Home Affairs) Ho Peng Kee stated that groups whose activities were related to religious, ethnic, civil, and political rights, or the governance of Singapore, needed to be carefully screened because they may potentially give rise to "law and order" problems and cary out activities that may be prejudicial to the national interest. In addit: on, these groups needed to be scrutinized closely to ensure that "foreign elements do not hijack [them] to serve a foreign agenda which is contrary to our national interests" (Parliamentary Debates, Republic ofSingapore: Official Report 2004, p. 37). For this reason, local NGOs are understandably wary of receiving funding from overseas sources for fear that this may result in government suspicion about their activities .
Against this backdrop, it is easy to understand why the TWC2 had limited opportunities to engage with groups elsewhere. This does not mean, however, that it was unable to engage with a range of circulating transnational discourses about the local, regional, and global factors that have lead to the feminization of transnational labour. This is evident in the group's decision to describe maids as "workers", as well as in its campaign to improve "conditions ofwork". Both ofthese terms (and the claims that underpin them) draw on international labour rights discourses. In common with migrant worker organizations elsewhere, the TWC2's focus on employment contracts concentrated on the standardization and regulation ofworking hours and tasks, and equality of wages. The group also argued for the incorporation of domestic workers into the Employment Act so that they could ensure, among other things, mandatory days off (Tan TH. 24 June 2003) . The TWC2 also campaigned for the right of domestic workers to "live out". Under the conditions of their employment contracts and Work Passes, all FDWs are required to live in the homes of their employers. This leads to a situation in which domestic workers find themselves "on-call" twenty-four hours a day. The separation between "working hours" and "leisure hours" thus becomes blurred. In addition, migrant workers are rarely permitted to bring friends or relatives into their employers' homes. The TWC2 argued that allowing migrant workers to live outside the workplace would better replicate the conditions of other "workers" and improve the conditions of their daily lives.
This claim, however, did not extend to another important aspect of international labour campaigns -workers' rights in relation to marriage and migration. Under the conditions of their work permits, domestic workers in Singapore (like other Work Pass holders) are forbidden from marrying local citizens.21 Any woman found to have married a Singaporean man is immediately deported and barred from re-entering the country. A former Work Pass holder who marries a Singaporean man in another country at the end ofher contract faces difficulty in obtaining a re-entry visa to live with her husband. Similarly, any woman found to become pregnant during her contract is forcibly repatriated. The regulation of domestic worker sexuality is enforced through a programme ofcompulsory six monthly medical check-ups. Any woman found to have contracted sexually transmitted disease is also repatriated. Although state regulation of domestic worker sexuality and restrictions on a woman's right to marry are two important aspects of migrant worker rights, the TWC2 did not make them the focus of its campaign.
Its concern was with standardizing conditions of employment rather than with addressing broader human rights issues.
Similarly, the TWC2 failed to address the issue of migrant workers' rights to bring their families with them during the period of their employment contract. Professional "foreign talent" can apply for dependant's passes for their spouse and children, while Work Pass holders cannot. Many studies have reported on the extreme hardship faced by migrant workers who leave their families at home when they travel abroad to work for several years (Constable 1997; Chin 2003) . Such workers not only face the prohibitive cost ofvisiting their families during this pericd, but also tight restrictions on their ability to take recreational leave. Paradoxically, women working as maids; leave the care of their own children to relatives while they raise their employers' children. Many women become estranged from their spouse and children after many years abroad.
Rather than focusing on changes to the immigration law, the TWC2 advocated for improved training and skills development for migrant workers, which would assist them to "go home" and support their families. This focus on transferable skills development is also common among migrant worker activists operating in other countries (Weekley 2004) . Such training activities are endorsed without proper recognition of the difficulties that such women face in seeking alternative sources of employment. Many FDWs have completed secondary or tertiary education and worked in the manufacturing or service sectors prior to being deployed overseas. Focus on skills training also overlooks the multitude of reasons why women seek work abroad. While remittances may form an important part of their decision-making, many women choose to go overseas to escape difficult family situations, gain financial independence, travel, or develop networks that allow them to migrate to third countries (Huang and Yeoh 1998; Constable 1997) . The focus on training also overlooks the difficulties that domestic workers face in finding time to attend classes. By focusing on cooking, sewing, and hairdressing, many training programmes also reinforce a gendered division of labour that marginalizes domestic workers as "women" workers. It also assumes that domestic workers want "skills upgrading" in order to "improve" themselves.22
The focus on skills training meant that the TWC2 lost the ability to focus on the particularities oftheir experiences as national subjects. The label "foreign domestic worker" replaced the value-laden "maid", but in the process, this new identity was also cut off from the specificity of national debates that link economic restructuring and globalization with the increasing feminization of transnational migration. This includes recognition of the place of Singapore as an importer of migrant labour and ofmiddle-class Singaporean women as consumers ofother women's labour. Instead, attention to "demand and supply" issues rested on the assertion that Singaporean families need to re-organize the way they manage household work (and thus reduce the demand for maids), and that domestic workers need to be provided with training that would equip them for alternative employment (presumably "back home") . In advocating for better training opportunities, the TWC2 clearly drew on transnational discourses of "skills development" that are promoted by both sending and receiving governments, as well as migrant worker organizations. Like many groups operating in other countries, it also failed to address the important class and ethnic divisions that underpin the work of migrant worker organizations (see, for example, Weekley 2004 ).
In the absence of a critique of globalization and its impact on citizenship and human rights, the TWC2's activities remained narrowly focused on national issues. Paradoxically, while the TWC2's focus on the gendered division of labour rested on a feminist critique of patriarchal 236Lenore LYONS family structures and was thus critical ofthe ruling government's support for traditional gender ideologies, it was also supportive: of the PAP's assertion that Singaporean families are "maid-dependent".23 The "maid problem" was thus presented as a national issue requiring a solution that would reduce the numbers of FDWs while simultaneously finding alternatives to ths gendered division of labour within the home. This dilemma reflects ongoing debates within feminist theory about middleclass women's reliance on working-class women's transnational labour (Anderson 2000) .
Despite its crkical statements about the PAP government's policy on FDWs, theTWC2's anti-violence campaign was supportive ofthe state's own interest in developing a gracious and more civic-minded citizen in contrast to the image of the "ugly Singaporean" conjured up by images of maid abuse. Even so, this campaign was able to inject a critical dimension by exploring the ways in which a culture of abuse towards maids was part of a wider system of abuse towards women. In a letter published in the Forum pages of the national English daily newspaper, Constance Singam, a member of the TWC2 and former president of AWARE, noted that:
The culture of abuse in the private space cannot be isolated from the wider culture. The overarching ideologies of patriarchy and Confucianism and the resultant hierarchical structure and effect on the status of women, class and race prejudice, the family-unfriendly corporate culture -all these have a direct impact on our perception of foreign domestic workers, housework, abuse and the formulation of public policies. (Singam 2003) This message, however, received little public attention. In the press, maid abuse was largely understood as an individual act by "sick" employers and thus a national shame (Yeoh, Huang, and Devasahayam 2004) . Although Singam and other TWC2 members linked violence with patriarchy, :here were few opportunities to broaden the group's campaign to demonstrate that "they" (FDWs) were ¡ust like "us" (Singaporean women).24 The TWC2's attempts to publicly link violence against maids with violence against all women also failed to receive support from local women's groups. Although both the SCWO and AWARE have had a long-term interest in action to curb violence against women, and were listed as TWC2 "partners", neither joined with the TWC2 to highlight the structural basis of gender violence against FDWs. In part, this may reflect concerns about overstepping the state's OB markers by working closely with an unregistered NGO. tight editorial control. Although the TWC2 found that its attempts to publish letters in the Forum pages were sometimes restricted, its campaign by and large received the support of the press. Given Lee Hsien Loong's recent statements about the media's role as a co-partner in civic society whose role it is to educate the public, the support that the TWC2 received from the media is indicative of the PAP's own attitude towards the group's campaign. It is unlikely that the TWC2 would have received such coverage if its views significantly challenged the ruling party or promoted values that the PAP felt were counter to the national interest.25 An unexpected outcome of the media's focus on violence against maids was a backlash by those who felt that the TWC2 was responsible for Singaporeans being portrayed as violent and abusive in the foreign press. In justifying its actions, the TWC2 claimed that its focus had always been internal and that it had never initiated contact with nonSingaporean journalists. Nonetheless, it claimed that its actions played a crucial role in "balancing" the often-prejudicial views of the foreign media:
When TWC2 stretches out its hands to aggrieved FDWs, that gesture helps to moderate tension in the relationship. It helps to fight the prejudicial view that people in Singapore is bloody-minded or indifferent about the FDWs welfare. (TWC2 2003e, p. 7) 238Lenore LYONS In this statement, the TWC2 re-asserts its role as a nationally oriented civic society organization. Although foreign journalists reported on the TWC2's work, advocating beyond the borders was not part of its mission. Instead: its concerns lay much closer to home: changing the mindsets and actions of Singaporeans. In this sense, the TWC2's work remains supportive of the PAP's vision of an active citizenry engaged in the national project of making Singapore a "better place to live". The TWC2 makes no claims to be engaged in a transnational, movement of activists interested in improving the lives ofmigrant workers everywhere nor of addressin ? the forces of globalization that compiei millions of people to seek work beyond the borders of their own nation-states. Instead, it is a group of concerned citizens whose aim it is to improve the conditions of employment of transient workers who find themselves employed briefly in Singapore.
Conclusion
In this paper I have attempted to move the analysis of Singaporean civil society away from the restrictive boundaries of the nation (and the seemingly pervasive power ofthe state) to focus on a broader ethnoscape of activism. My discussion remains focused at the local (national) level, however, because of the TWC2's limited ability to engage beyond Singapore's borders to the regional or international level. While the TWC2 may not openly engage with activists across borders, they clearly engage with other types of transnational actors (that is, FDWs) as well as transnational ideas (including international human rights discourses).
My interest in exploring these connections is to examine the extent to which the TWC2 is able to draw on these transnational linkages to challenge the PAP's vision of both civil society and an active citizenry. These issues are important, not only to Singapore's civil society actors, but also to feminists interested in forging effective transnational alliances.
It is important to remember, however, that the TWC2 was not primarily motivated by a desire to challenge the PAP's discourse ofcivic society. For this reason, I want to emphasize the significani: achievements made during the group's first year-long campaign. Throughout 2003 the TWC2 ran a successful public education campaign focused on violence against maids and standardized employment contracts. Its work was unprecedented for both the attention it received in the media, as well as for the diversity and intensity of its campaign. In Singapore's small civil society sphere, NGOs continually face problems of burnout and lack oftime among their volunteers. The TWC2 was able to harness the energies of its membership and use a range of events to reinforce its message. Not only has its work led to important changes in government policy and employment agency practices, but it has also contributed to a widespread public debate about the demand for FDWs and Singapore's treatment of its migrant workforce.
Without downplaying these achievements, I also want to explore the extent to which the TWC2 was able to challenge the PAP's "ground rules" for civil society activism. My analysis has shown that while the TWC2's activities were creative, ultimately they remained nonconfrontational and consensual. Despite the fact that much of the TWC2's work was focused on non-citizens, its activities provided few opportunities to challenge the assertion that civic society is a space occupied by Singaporeans engaged in a process of consensual nationbuilding. FDWs were rarely included as equal partners, and where they did participate it was often because they were known to individual TWC2 members through their work (that is, as the employee of a member or his/her family). The difficulties faced by the TWC2 in including FDWs as active members is partly a reflection ofthe problems faced by all Singaporean NGOs and trade unions who try to advocate on behalf of non-citizens. I also want to suggest, however, that it also draws on a dominant discourse within the organization that portrays FDWs as primarily victims, always workers, and ultimately aliens.
In contrast, the TWC2's members are archetype "active citizens". They engage in thoughtful discussions, they do not publicly challenge the PAP, and they make measured suggestions to improve Singaporean life. Their campaigns remained supportive of the state's own interest in developing a gracious and more civic-minded citizen. This conservatism reflects well-founded concerns about overstepping the state's unspecified OB markers. It also reflects the conservative nature ofthe group's gender activism. Although there was scope in the discussion of housework to discuss gender inequality, it remained focused on gender difference; that is, it focused on getting more men to do housework, rather than addressing women's primary role as mothers in the process of nationbuilding. At a national level, its work could have provided an important opportunity to address the intersection between domestic violence against all women, and the "private" nature ofviolence against domestic workers (that is, a critique ofthe public/private dualism implicit in state policy-making), or the commonalities between local workers and foreign workers. Instead, it remained largely focused on migrant women, thus reinforcing an us/them dualism. The group lacked radical potential because its members failed to address the substantive ssues of class, gender, ethniciy, and citizenship that underpin the demand for domestic migrant labour, as well as the factors that constrain the rights of these workers. Ultimately, the TWC2 did not challenge the view that civil society is only about national concerns; its work focused on improving Singaporean society.
The formation oftheTWC2, and its first year of activism, represents an important moment in the history of civil society in Singapore under the PAP. Drawing on the model provided by the TWC, it was able to present a vision ofNGO activism that was both refreshing and exciting. The group's public education campaign and lobbying activities brought about significant advances for migrant workers. These gains, however, are merely indicative of the extent to which the organization was able to play by the PAP's ground rules. Despite the creativity of its campaigns and the slightly unorthodox nature of its organizational structure, the TWC2 did not signify a relaxation of the OB markers. The TWC2's work is a successful example ofa civil society group inculcating the state's own vision of w iat civic society and active citizens should be. In this sense, it represents what the government describes as a "maturing" of the citizenry -the ability to deal with potentially sensitive issues in a careful and considered manner without challenging PAP rule. * Earlier versions ofmis paper were presented at the CAPSTRANS Newcastle Seminar Series, and the Singapore Studies Wotkshop held at the University ofWollongong in October 2004. 1 want to thank colleagues who participated in those seminars for their thoughtful questions and feedback. I also wish to thank two anonymous reviewers for dieir insightful comments and suggestions.
1 . A term used to describe expatriate white-collar professionals. The term "migrant worker" is used for low-skilled workers in the construction and manufacturing industries, as well as domestic workers.
2.There are few in-depth studies of NGOs or civil society actors in Singapore, but see Lyons (2000b Lyons ( , 2000a Lyons ( , 2004 ) for a discussion of die Association ofWomen for Action and Research (AWARE), and Singam et al. (2002) for a discussion of the Wotking Committee. 3.The ruling elite sometimes uses "civic society" interchangeable wirli "civil society", however, the precise difference between the two terms remains deliberately ambiguous in most government statements. 4.The ISA provides the state with the means to artest and detain witliout trial those individuals or groups that in its view threaten the national security. 5.For example, most recently die Societies Act has been used to restrict die activities of the gay rights organization People Like Us (Tanaka 2002, p. 209; People Like Us 2000).
6.The workers arrested were detained for varying periods. Some were charged and had to admit to being a Marxist as a condition of their release. They were "rehabilitated" with an agreement not to enter into politics. 9.The TWC operated as an informal netwotk of individuals and representatives ofNGOs and VWOs. Its goal was to build links between differently situated civil society actors, and thereby participate in both re-assessing and re-invigorating the sphere of civil society in Singapore. Unlike other NGOs, the TWC was not formally registered through the Societies Act, but opetated as a loose affiliation of individuals and organizations. During this time, it otganized workshops, open houses (public visits to the offices of NGOs), public forums, and a conference.
By deliberately limiting its lifespan to one yeat, and focusing its activities on "netwotk building" rather than putsuing the intetests of a particular client ot membership group, the TWC was able to avoid the othetwise lestrictive requirements of registration under the Societies Act. Not only did it facilitate gteater informat on sharing amongst Singaporean NGOs and V WOs, but it also acted as a focal point for broader public discussion of the meaning of civil society (Singam et al. 2002) . 10.The Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme was introduced in 1990 to co-opt alternative non-partisan voices into parliament. NMPs ate nominated by members of the public, NGOs, or VWOs, and appointed by the government for a term ofdiree years. While NMPs share die same parliamentary privileges and immunities as notmal MPs, they have limited voting rights and do not play a role in the running cf town councils.
11.The White Ribbon Campaign is an international programme organized by men where ribbon wearers pledge "never to commit, nevei to condone and never to remain silent about violence against women" (White Ribbon Campaign 2003).
12.Block here refers to a housing apartment block, the main form of housing in Singapore. 13.The PAP effectively rules Singapote as a one-patty state. During the TWC2's campaign, thete were only two non-PAP members of parliament out of total of 84 MPs, and the party whip maintains tight control over PAP MPs voting patterns. 14.Braema Mathi's -erm as an NMP has since ended. The opportunity fot die TWC2 to table such a B 11 would depend on die group finding another supporter amongst the current crop of NMPs. enter on tourist visas that are later converted to workers permits. Many women have their passports and official papers confiscated by recruitment agents or employets in an effort to discourage them from "tunning away '. 19.These same problems are likely to petsist under the newTWC2, even though its Constitution expressly allows for Work Permit holders to join the organization. 20.In 1998, AWATtE presented a petition to the Indonesian Embassy decrying the treatment of ethnically Chinese women in Indonesia who were raped during a series of racial clashes that year. In receiving the petition, a spokeswoman for die Indonesian Embassy pointed out that Indonesian women were frequent victims of violent abuse while woiking as domestic workers in Singapore, an issue that AWARE had not addressed (Zakaria 1998 and order" problems. Its second attempt, to stage an outdoor public performance and talk about violence against women was rejected on the grounds that speeches were not allowed outdoors except at Speakers' Corner. In its third attempt, the TWC2 applied fot a public entertainment licence to stage a "song and dance" performance but was also knocked back (T. Tan 22 November 2003). 25.This was clearly demonstrated in 1994 when prominent Singaporean novelist Catherine Lim published two articles in the English daily, the Straits Times, about the government. Then Ptime Ministet Goh Chok Tong issued strong public rebuttals to her comments explaining diat he had to respond to her articles because it was incumbent upon him to "set out the out-of-bounds markers clearly, so that everyone knows the limits of openness and consultation" ("Chastised Once, but Writer Stands by Het Views", 21 June 2003).
